Cheap talk with coarse understanding
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding
- Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
- Cheap talk and burned money
- Competitive cheap talk
- Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
- Long Cheap Talk
- Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources
- Comparative cheap talk
- Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences
- Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
Cites work
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
- Bayesian networks and boundedly rational expectations
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models
- Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
- Communication under language barriers
- Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
- Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited
- Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games
- Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
- Language barriers
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
Cited in
(8)
This page was built for publication: Cheap talk with coarse understanding
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2212741)
