Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.006zbMath1142.91010MaRDI QIDQ2427128

Frédéric Koessler, Philippe Jehiel

Publication date: 8 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

CoordinationBayesian gamesBounded rationalityIncomplete informationStrategic information transmissionBettingAnalogy expectation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (25)

Large strategic dynamic interactions ⋮ Games with incomplete information when players are partially aware of others' signals ⋮ Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information ⋮ Multi-state choices with aggregate feedback on unfamiliar alternatives ⋮ No trade ⋮ Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences ⋮ Paying attention to payoffs in analogy-based learning ⋮ Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment ⋮ The winner's curse: conditional reasoning and belief formation ⋮ Naive traders and mispricing in prediction markets ⋮ Cheap talk with coarse understanding ⋮ Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games ⋮ Strategic interpretations ⋮ An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment ⋮ Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions ⋮ Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models ⋮ Disclosure of information under competition: an experimental study ⋮ RULE RATIONALITY ⋮ A game-free microfoundation of mutual optimism ⋮ Modeling players with random ``data access ⋮ Learning (to disagree?) in large worlds ⋮ Dynamic coordination via organizational routines ⋮ The partially cursed and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium ⋮ Sellouts, beliefs, and bandwagon behavior ⋮ An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk

Cites Work

• Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Approximate common knowledge and co-ordination: Recent lessons from game theory
• Social learning in recurring games
• Learning to play Bayesian games.
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment
• Strategic Information Transmission
• ON PRE-PLAY NEGOTIATIONS AND ZERO-SUM BETTING
• Cursed Equilibrium

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