Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information

DOI10.1080/01621459.1983.10477988MaRDI QIDQ2740906zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James K. Sebenius, John D. Geanakoplos

Publication date 17 October 2001

Published in Journal of the American Statistical Association (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1983.10477988

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01)

Recommendations

• Risk, uncertainty and hidden information
• Bargaining over bets
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Bargaining with common values
• Geanakoplos and Sebenius model with noise.

Cites work

• Agreeing to disagree
• An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• We can't disagree forever

Cited in

(33)

• Bargaining over bets
• Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
• Risk, uncertainty and hidden information
• Rationalizable trade
• Agreeing to disagree and dilation
• Speculation under unawareness
• On the duality between prior beliefs and trading demands
• Common knowledge: The case of linear regression
• Disagreement is unpredictable.
• Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty
• Ex ante versus interim rationality and the existence of bubbles
• The incoherence of agreeing to disagree
• Agreement theorem for neo-additive beliefs
• Geanakoplos and Sebenius model with noise.
• Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
• Common priors under endogenous uncertainty
• Learning (to disagree?) in large worlds
• Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems
• Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and consensus
• Updating awareness and information aggregation
• On loss aversion, level-1 reasoning, and betting
• Conflict without an apparent cause
• Informational externalities and emergence of consensus
• No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors
• Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
• Belief consistency and trade consistency
• Rational expectations can preclude trades
• Aggregate information, common knowledge and agreeing not to bet
• Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors
• A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF SPECULATIVE TRADE IN A TWO-SIDED ASSET MARKET WITH INFORMATION DIVERSITY
• Trusting: Alone and together
• Information aggregation under ambiguity: theory and experimental evidence
• ``Agreeing to disagree type results under ambiguity

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