No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.04.006zbMath1410.91336OpenAlexW2889409456WikidataQ127994335 ScholiaQ127994335MaRDI QIDQ2419594

Alia Gizatulina, Ziv Hellman

Publication date: 14 June 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/254610/2/HeteroTradeJuillet2018changed-2.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

rationalitycommon knowledgespeculative tradeno trade theoremcommon priorsno betting theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (1)

Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium

Cites Work

• Information, trade and common knowledge
• We can't disagree forever
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Agreeing to disagree
• Common priors and separation of convex sets
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Rationalizable trade
• Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
• Approximating agreeing to disagree results with common \(p\)-beliefs
• (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)
• Almost common priors
• The positive foundation of the common prior assumption
• Common beliefs and the existence of speculative trade
• Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
• On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms

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