No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors
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Publication:2419594
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.04.006zbMath1410.91336OpenAlexW2889409456WikidataQ127994335 ScholiaQ127994335MaRDI QIDQ2419594
Publication date: 14 June 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/254610/2/HeteroTradeJuillet2018changed-2.pdf
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Cites Work
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