Almost common priors
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Publication:2376069
DOI10.1007/S00182-012-0347-5zbMATH Open1269.91015OpenAlexW2030576734MaRDI QIDQ2376069FDOQ2376069
Authors: Ziv Hellman 
Publication date: 26 June 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0347-5
Recommendations
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)
Cites Work
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Agreeing to disagree
- Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
- Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
- Common priors and separation of convex sets
- How common are common priors?
- The distance between two convex sets
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information
Cited In (9)
- Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors
- Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors
- How common are common priors?
- Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium
- Common priors and separation of convex sets
- The positive foundation of the common prior assumption
- Bounded arbitrage and nearly rational behavior
- Agreeing to disagree with lexicographic prior beliefs
- No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors
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