Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors

DOI10.1007/s00182-022-00805-4zbMath1505.91102OpenAlexW4307730050MaRDI QIDQ2100103

Miklós Pintér, Ziv Hellman

Publication date: 21 November 2022

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00805-4

zbMATH Keywords

common priorprobability chargeno betting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

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