Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors
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Publication:2100103
DOI10.1007/s00182-022-00805-4zbMath1505.91102OpenAlexW4307730050MaRDI QIDQ2100103
Publication date: 21 November 2022
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00805-4
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