Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
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Publication:1804022
DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1012zbMath0773.90109OpenAlexW2265040937MaRDI QIDQ1804022
Eddie Dekel, Adam Brandenburger
Publication date: 29 June 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1012
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