Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2416zbMath0910.90289MaRDI QIDQ1270762

Uday Rajan

Publication date: 3 November 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2416

zbMATH Keywords

perfect equilibria; almost common knowledge; near rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A60: Probabilistic games; gambling

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