Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
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- Rationalizability and logical inference
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- A syntactic approach to rationality in games with ordinal payoffs
- Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance
- Undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibria in quasi-supermodular games with monotonic externalities
- An epistemic characterization of MACA
- Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium
- Comprehensive rationalizability
- \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information
- On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
- The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
- Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games
- A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection
- Admissibility and common belief.
- Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance
- Dominance rationality: a unified approach
- Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information
- Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis
- Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
- On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes
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- Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Self-admissible sets
- Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
- Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
- Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty
- The role of monotonicity in the epistemic analysis of strategic games
- Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
- Perfect forward induction
- The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
- The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension
- Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models
- Weak belief and permissibility
- Possibility and permissibility
- Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games
- On \(p\)-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality
- Adversarial risk analysis under partial information
- A minimal logic for interactive epistemology
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