Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1067zbMATH Open0822.90141OpenAlexW1974724010MaRDI QIDQ1339752FDOQ1339752

Authors: Tilman Börgers 

Publication date: 8 December 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4378.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

weakly dominated strategiesfinite normal-form gamesstrongly dominated strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Utility theory (91B16)

Cited In (40)

• Undominated equilibria in games with strategic complementarities
• Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment
• Rationalizability and logical inference
• Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria
• A syntactic approach to rationality in games with ordinal payoffs
• Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance
• Undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibria in quasi-supermodular games with monotonic externalities
• Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium
• An epistemic characterization of MACA
• Comprehensive rationalizability
• \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information
• On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
• The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
• Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games
• A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection
• Admissibility and common belief.
• Dominance rationality: a unified approach
• Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information
• Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis
• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
• On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
• Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
• Self-admissible sets
• The role of monotonicity in the epistemic analysis of strategic games
• Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
• Perfect forward induction
• The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
• Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models
• The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension
• Weak belief and permissibility
• Possibility and permissibility
• Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games
• On \(p\)-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality
• Adversarial risk analysis under partial information
• A minimal logic for interactive epistemology
• The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability.

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