Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
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Publication:1339752
DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1067zbMath0822.90141OpenAlexW1974724010MaRDI QIDQ1339752
Publication date: 8 December 1994
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4378.pdf
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