The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability.

DOI10.1007/S001990050317MaRDI QIDQ1571052zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Vincent Vannetelbosch

Publication date 9 November 2000

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d11/d1173.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

RationalizabilityRefinements.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games
• ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance
• Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
• Iterated elimination procedures

Cited in

(6)

• Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games
• Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
• An epistemic characterization of MACA
• Iterated elimination procedures
• Weak* dominance
• Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games

This page was built for publication: The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability.

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1571052)