Iterated elimination procedures
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Publication:2205992
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Cites work
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Cited in
(17)- Iterated bounded dominance
- A syntactic approach to rationality in games with ordinal payoffs
- Order independence for rationalizability
- Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games
- Iterative information update and stability of strategies
- The computational complexity of iterated elimination of dominated strategies
- Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
- Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance
- The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
- Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Well-Founded Games
- Order independence for iterated weak dominance
- Infinite coordination games
- Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting
- Searching by elimination
- The Many Faces of Rationalizability
- Learning by the process of elimination
- The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability.
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