Iterated elimination procedures

DOI10.1007/S00199-019-01215-6MaRDI QIDQ2205992zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xiao Luo, Xuewen Qian, Chen Qu

Publication date 21 October 2020

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/59233/1/iterated%20elimination%20procedures.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

``outcome order independenceCD gamesiterated elimination proceduresmonotonicityorder independence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
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• Iterated strict dominance in general games

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Cited in

(20)

• Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability.
• Learning by the process of elimination
• Iterated dominance in quasisupermodular games with strict single crossing property.
• Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance
• The computational complexity of iterated elimination of dominated strategies
• The Many Faces of Rationalizability
• Infinite coordination games
• The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
• A syntactic approach to rationality in games with ordinal payoffs
• Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games
• Iterative information update and stability of strategies
• Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
• Iterated bounded dominance
• Order independence for rationalizability
• Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Well-Founded Games
• Pathologies of iterated strict dominance revisited
• Nested removal of strictly dominated strategies in infinite games
• Searching by elimination

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