Iterated elimination procedures

DOI10.1007/S00199-019-01215-6zbMATH Open1450.91002OpenAlexW2957146323MaRDI QIDQ2205992FDOQ2205992

Authors: Xiao Luo, Xuewen Qian, Chen Qu 

Publication date: 21 October 2020

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/59233/1/iterated%20elimination%20procedures.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityorder independence``outcome order independenceCD gamesiterated elimination procedures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

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Cited In (16)

• Iterated bounded dominance
• A syntactic approach to rationality in games with ordinal payoffs
• Order independence for rationalizability
• Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games
• Iterative information update and stability of strategies
• Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
• The computational complexity of iterated elimination of dominated strategies
• Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance
• The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
• Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Well-Founded Games
• Infinite coordination games
• Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting
• Searching by elimination
• The Many Faces of Rationalizability
• Learning by the process of elimination
• The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability.

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