Knowledge spaces with arbitrarily high rank
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Publication:1384016
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0591zbMath0895.90201MaRDI QIDQ1384016
Publication date: 13 April 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/0d9e06a1ab7498103e9e62e8aafd313bdc1b715f
91A99: Game theory
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- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model