Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
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Publication:1060139
DOI10.1007/BF01770224zbMath0567.90103OpenAlexW1995355963MaRDI QIDQ1060139
Shmuel Zamir, Jean-Francois Mertens
Publication date: 1985
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01770224
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