Fully endogenous mechanism selection on finite outcome sets

DOI10.1007/BF01212471MaRDI QIDQ1338095zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Roger Lagunoff

Publication date 27 November 1994

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212471

zbMATH Keywords

choice processfree choicefully endogenous mechanism selectioninfinite regress problemsocial outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
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Cites work

• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620853 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal

Cited in

(3)

• Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
• On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects
• Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints

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