Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.031zbMath1165.91335MaRDI QIDQ2389303

William S. Neilson, John P. Conley

Publication date: 15 July 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.031

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral economics; social norms; prisoners' dilemma; bilateral bargaining; endogenous games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91F99: Other social and behavioral sciences (mathematical treatment)

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

A theory of kindness, reluctance, and shame for social preferences

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Social norms, cooperation and inequality
• Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word
• Fully endogenous mechanism selection on finite outcome sets
• Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Bilateral commitment
• Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
• Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
• Evolution of Preferences1