Recommendations
Cites work
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
- Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations
- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 17956 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592673 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
- Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
- Sequential Equilibria
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- Social norms and random matching games
- Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
- The evolution of cooperation
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
Cited in
(24)- Asymmetric social norms
- Social norms and core outcomes in a sharecropping economy
- Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence
- Communities and social inefficiency with heterogeneous groups
- Social norms with private values: theory and experiments
- A theory of perceived discrimination
- Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints
- An experimental investigation of a third-person enforcement in a prisoner's dilemma game
- Dynamics and Stability of Collective Action Norms
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1189214 (Why is no real title available?)
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State
- History, expectations, and leadership in the evolution of social norms
- Social norms and cooperation
- The survival of inefficient and efficient norms: equilibria with and without meta-norms in a repeated norm enforcing game
- Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games
- Kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation
- The Influence of Social Values in Cooperation
- Relational utility and social norms in games
- Spontaneous discrimination with endogenous information disclosure
- The permissible and the forbidden
- Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
- Efficiency may improve when defectors exist
- Long-term relationships as safeguards
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