Social norms, cooperation and inequality
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Publication:852333
DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0045-7zbMATH Open1120.91003OpenAlexW1541045608MaRDI QIDQ852333FDOQ852333
Authors: Pedro Dal Bó
Publication date: 29 November 2006
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp802.pdf
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Cites Work
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Cited In (20)
- The Influence of Social Values in Cooperation
- Kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation
- Communities and social inefficiency with heterogeneous groups
- The survival of inefficient and efficient norms: equilibria with and without meta-norms in a repeated norm enforcing game
- Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
- Social norms and core outcomes in a sharecropping economy
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An experimental investigation of a third-person enforcement in a prisoner's dilemma game
- Efficiency may improve when defectors exist
- Social norms with private values: theory and experiments
- Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence
- Long-term relationships as safeguards
- Asymmetric social norms
- The permissible and the forbidden
- A theory of perceived discrimination
- History, expectations, and leadership in the evolution of social norms
- Dynamics and Stability of Collective Action Norms
- Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints
- Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games
- Social norms and cooperation
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