Efficiency may improve when defectors exist
From MaRDI portal
Publication:889254
DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0909-4zbMATH Open1367.91029OpenAlexW3125264500MaRDI QIDQ889254FDOQ889254
Authors: Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Nobue Suzuki 
Publication date: 6 November 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0909-4
Recommendations
- Trust and social efficiencies
- Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
- Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
- The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
- Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics
Cites Work
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
- Dismissals and quits in repeated games
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- The exact law of large numbers for independent random matching
- Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
- A dynamic foundation of the Rawlsian maxmin criterion
- Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
- Social norms, cooperation and inequality
- Search theory, competitive equilibrium, and the Nash bargaining solution
- Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
- Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation
- Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
- Minorities and Endogenous Segregation
- Long-term relationships as safeguards
Cited In (2)
This page was built for publication: Efficiency may improve when defectors exist
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q889254)
