Efficiency may improve when defectors exist

DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0909-4zbMath1367.91029MaRDI QIDQ889254

Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Nobue Suzuki

Publication date: 6 November 2015

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0909-4

zbMATH Keywords

efficiency; diversity; prisoner's dilemma; voluntary separation; endogenous partnerships

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

91B68: Matching models

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