Dismissals and quits in repeated games
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Publication:2268132
DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0422-0zbMath1185.91041OpenAlexW1997080785MaRDI QIDQ2268132
Publication date: 10 March 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0422-0
Related Items (3)
Multiple agents finitely repeated inspection game with dismissals ⋮ Efficiency may improve when defectors exist ⋮ Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
Cites Work
- A ``super folk theorem for dynastic repeated games
- Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
- Finitely Repeated Games
- Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem
- Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
- Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
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