Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:993792
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.02.004zbMATH Open1201.91160OpenAlexW3121670828MaRDI QIDQ993792FDOQ993792
Authors: Matthew O. Jackson, Alison Watts 
Publication date: 20 September 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/95031/
Recommendations
Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Renegotiation in repeated games
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Dismissals and quits in repeated games
- Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
- On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games.
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- Experiments with network formation
- Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
- Network formation and social coordination
- Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
- Starting small and renegotiation
- Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining
- Trust in triads: Effects of exit, control, and learning.
- Trust and social efficiencies
Cited In (14)
- Constrained interactions and social coordination
- Competition fosters trust
- Forward-looking behavior in hawk-dove games in endogenous networks: experimental evidence
- Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games
- Farsighted clustering with group-size effects and reputations
- Equilibrium selection and the role of information in repeated matching markets
- Edgar Allan Poe's riddle: framing effects in repeated matching pennies games
- Dismissals and quits in repeated games
- Experiments with network formation
- Choosing sides in a two-sided matching market
- Gridlock or leadership in U.S. electoral politics
- Social coordination and network formation in bipartite networks
- Networks and stability
- Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design
This page was built for publication: Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q993792)
