Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
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The authors provide a general framework and methodology for analyzing how matching and the play of games interact. They focus on favouring small populations in equilibrium play, and show how repetition can change behaviour.
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Cites work
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
- Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Comparative statics in matching markets
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- Dismissals and quits in repeated games
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- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
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- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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- Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games
- Renegotiation in repeated games
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- Trust and social efficiencies
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Cited in
(16)- Rotations: Matching schemes that efficiently preserve the best reply structure of a one shot game
- Equilibrium selection and the role of information in repeated matching markets
- Dismissals and quits in repeated games
- Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games
- Social coordination and network formation in bipartite networks
- Competition fosters trust
- Constrained interactions and social coordination
- Forward-looking behavior in hawk-dove games in endogenous networks: experimental evidence
- Gridlock or leadership in U.S. electoral politics
- Networks and stability
- Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games
- Choosing sides in a two-sided matching market
- Farsighted clustering with group-size effects and reputations
- Edgar Allan Poe's riddle: framing effects in repeated matching pennies games
- Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design
- Experiments with network formation
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