On renegotiation-proof equilibria in finitely repeated games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0038zbMATH Open0851.90146OpenAlexW2038236599MaRDI QIDQ1919682FDOQ1919682

Quan Wen

Publication date: 25 November 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0038

zbMATH Keywords

finitely repeated gamesaverage payoffsrenegotiation-proof equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (7)

• Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium in Infinitely Repeated Games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• FORWARD-LOOKING PRINCIPLE IN REPEATED GAMES
• Renegotiation perfection in infinite games
• Unilateral commitments in finitely repeated games
• Justifiable punishments in repeated games
• Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games

This page was built for publication: On renegotiation-proof equilibria in finitely repeated games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1919682)