On renegotiation-proof equilibria in finitely repeated games
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Publication:1919682
DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0038zbMATH Open0851.90146OpenAlexW2038236599MaRDI QIDQ1919682FDOQ1919682
Authors: Quan Wen
Publication date: 25 November 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0038
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- Efficiency and renegotiation in repeated games
- Internally renegotiation-proof equilibrium sets: Limit behavior with low discounting
- Renegotiation perfection in infinite games
- Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
- Unilateral commitments in finitely repeated games
- The impossibility of stable renegotiation
- Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
- Efficient renegotiation - proof equilibria in repeated games
- Renegotiation-proof equilibrium: Reply
- Justifiable punishments in repeated games
- Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
- Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
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