Internally renegotiation-proof equilibrium sets: Limit behavior with low discounting

DOI10.1006/GAME.1994.1009MaRDI QIDQ1317342zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Debraj Ray

Publication date 24 March 1994

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1009

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gameefficient outcomesinternal consistencyrenegotiation-proof equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Renegotiation perfection in infinite games
• Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games
• Efficient renegotiation - proof equilibria in repeated games
• Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
• On renegotiation-proof equilibria in finitely repeated games

Cited in

(7)

• An axiomatization of plays in repeated games
• Bargaining power in repeated games
• From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information
• Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting
• Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
• Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
• Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency

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