Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.12.008MaRDI QIDQ629322zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Cheng Wang

Publication date 9 March 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/p3837-2005-07-25.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

labor marketdynamic contractequilibrium termination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
• Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance
• Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• Internally renegotiation-proof equilibrium sets: Limit behavior with low discounting
• Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
• Job Matching and the Wage Distribution
• On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Opportunity and Social Mobility
• Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
• Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
• Technology?Policy Interaction in Frictional Labour-Markets
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts

Cited in

(10)

• Outside opportunities and termination
• Optimal self-enforcement and termination
• Optimal CEO turnover
• DYNAMIC CONTRACTS WITH WORKER MOBILITY VIA DIRECTED ON-THE-JOB SEARCH
• Contingent Labor Contracting Under Demand and Supply Uncertainty
• Investment and bilateral insurance
• Optimal contract for the principal-agent under Knightian uncertainty
• Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
• INCENTIVES AND THE COST OF FIRING IN AN EQUILIBRIUM LABOR MARKET MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS LAYOFFS*
• Termination as an incentive device

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