Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
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Cites work
- A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
- Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
- Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance
- Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts
- Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
- Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
- Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- Internally renegotiation-proof equilibrium sets: Limit behavior with low discounting
- Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
- Job Matching and the Wage Distribution
- On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Opportunity and Social Mobility
- Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
- Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
- Technology?Policy Interaction in Frictional Labour-Markets
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
Cited in
(10)- Outside opportunities and termination
- Optimal self-enforcement and termination
- Optimal CEO turnover
- DYNAMIC CONTRACTS WITH WORKER MOBILITY VIA DIRECTED ON-THE-JOB SEARCH
- Contingent Labor Contracting Under Demand and Supply Uncertainty
- Investment and bilateral insurance
- Optimal contract for the principal-agent under Knightian uncertainty
- Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
- INCENTIVES AND THE COST OF FIRING IN AN EQUILIBRIUM LABOR MARKET MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS LAYOFFS*
- Termination as an incentive device
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