A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
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Publication:3521316
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00486.xzbMath1141.91612OpenAlexW2090368673MaRDI QIDQ3521316
Publication date: 21 August 2008
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00486.x
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