A theory of political and economic cycles
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Publication:406397
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.07.004zbMath1309.91099OpenAlexW3123453447MaRDI QIDQ406397
Pierre Yared, Laurence Ales, Pricila Maziero
Publication date: 8 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.07.004
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) History, political science (91F10)
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