Recommendations
Cites work
- A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
- A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
- A theory of political and economic cycles
- Dynamic Mirrlees Taxation under Political Economy Constraints
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Cited in
(11)- A theory of political and economic cycles
- A theory of political cycles
- Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model
- Political Cycles and Cyclical Policies
- Cycles and chaos in a socialist economy
- Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
- Intervention uncertainty, household health, and pandemic
- Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results
- Power fluctuations and political economy
- Economic fluctuations and fiscal policy in Europe: a political business cycles approach using panel data and clustering (1996--2013)
- Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment
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