Optimal retention in agency problems

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2422MaRDI QIDQ1276112zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jeffrey S. Banks, Rangarajan K. Sundaram

Publication date 16 June 1999

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2422

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionmoral hazardseries of short-lived agentssingle long-lived principal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Economic growth models (91B62)

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Cites work

• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4091137 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3466042 (Why is no real title available?)
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• One-Sector Nonclassical Optimal Growth: Optimality Conditions and Comparative Dynamics
• Parametric continuity in dynamic programming problems
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(15)

• Reelection threshold contracts in politics
• Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems
• Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958--2000)
• Strategic consensus
• Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets
• Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover
• Attorney fees in repeated relationships
• Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections
• On the benefits of party competition
• The good, the bad and the ugly: agent behavior and efficiency in open and closed organizations
• Endogenous agency problems and the dynamics of rents
• A theory of political and economic cycles
• On selecting the right agent
• Accountability in Markovian elections
• Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word

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