Optimal retention in agency problems

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2422zbMATH Open0915.90051OpenAlexW2068316288MaRDI QIDQ1276112FDOQ1276112

Authors: Jeffrey S. Banks, Rangarajan K. Sundaram 

Publication date: 16 June 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2422

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zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionmoral hazardseries of short-lived agentssingle long-lived principal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• One-Sector Nonclassical Optimal Growth: Optimality Conditions and Comparative Dynamics
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Parametric continuity in dynamic programming problems

Cited In (14)

• Attorney fees in repeated relationships
• Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets
• A theory of political and economic cycles
• Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958--2000)
• Strategic consensus
• Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover
• Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word
• Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections
• Endogenous agency problems and the dynamics of rents
• The good, the bad and the ugly: agent behavior and efficiency in open and closed organizations
• On the benefits of party competition
• Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems
• Reelection threshold contracts in politics
• On selecting the right agent

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