Optimal retention in agency problems

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2422zbMath0915.90051MaRDI QIDQ1276112

Rangarajan K. Sundaram, Jeffrey S. Banks

Publication date: 16 June 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2422

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazard; adverse selection; series of short-lived agents; single long-lived principal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)

91B62: Economic growth models

Related Items

A theory of political and economic cycles, Reelection threshold contracts in politics, Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958--2000), Strategic consensus, Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover, Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections, On the benefits of party competition

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• One-Sector Nonclassical Optimal Growth: Optimality Conditions and Comparative Dynamics
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Parametric continuity in dynamic programming problems