Countervailing incentives in agency problems
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Publication:1824530
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90083-5zbMath0682.90015MaRDI QIDQ1824530
David E. M. Sappington, Tracy R. Lewis
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90083-5
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