Pessimistic information gathering
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Publication:2347771
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.014zbMath1318.91138OpenAlexW2130831373MaRDI QIDQ2347771
David Martimort, Elisabetta Iossa
Publication date: 8 June 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.014
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