scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5178094
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Publication:3594546
zbMATH Open1303.91108MaRDI QIDQ3594546FDOQ3594546
Authors: Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki 
Publication date: 8 August 2007
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Cited In (28)
- Auctions with entry and resale
- Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition
- Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
- Robust mechanism design. The role of private information and higher order beliefs. With a foreword by Eric Maskin
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Optimal auctions with information acquisition
- Mechanism design by observant and informed planners
- Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- Mechanism design with informational punishment
- Mechanism design with information acquisition
- An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly
- Pessimistic information gathering
- Mechanisms for information elicitation
- Contextual mechanism design
- On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design
- Information acquisition during a Dutch auction
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
- On the types of information and mechanism design
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
- Optimal advertising of auctions
- Endogenous information and stochastic contracts
- Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
- Interactive information design
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
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