Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
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Publication:2168548
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Cites work
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Auctions with costly information acquisition
- Bargaining with endogenous information
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5178094 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
- Information acquisition and under-diversification
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Information acquisition in committees
- Information Acquisition in Financial Markets
- Learning matters: reappraising object allocation rules when agents strategically investigate
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Matching and chatting: an experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms
- Optimal auctions with information acquisition
- School choice: an experimental study
- Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
- Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
- Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
- Student portfolios and the college admissions problem
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions
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