Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
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Publication:4586009
DOI10.3982/TE1335zbMATH Open1395.91338MaRDI QIDQ4586009FDOQ4586009
Authors: Sophie Bade 
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cited In (16)
- Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
- Possible and necessary allocations under serial dictatorship with incomplete preference lists
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
- Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship
- Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets
- Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
- Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets
- Serial dictatorship and unmatch reduction: a problem of Japan's nursery school choice
- Learning matters: reappraising object allocation rules when agents strategically investigate
- Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
- Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
- Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
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