Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
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Publication:4586009
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- Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship
- Learning matters: reappraising object allocation rules when agents strategically investigate
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
- Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
- Serial dictatorship and unmatch reduction: a problem of Japan's nursery school choice
- Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets
- Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
- Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
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