Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
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Publication:2386134
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.004zbMath1115.91019OpenAlexW1994569768MaRDI QIDQ2386134
Anna Bogomolnaia, Lars Ehlers, Rajat K. Deb
Publication date: 22 August 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.004
Related Items (20)
Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof ⋮ Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain ⋮ A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain ⋮ Consistent house allocation ⋮ Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement ⋮ Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods ⋮ Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result ⋮ Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources ⋮ A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list ⋮ Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient? ⋮ The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects ⋮ A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences ⋮ Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions ⋮ Random assignment under weak preferences ⋮ Influence in private-goods allocation ⋮ Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects ⋮ Pairwise kidney exchange
Cites Work
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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