Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
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Publication:5475030
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00383zbMath1141.91563OpenAlexW4246839804MaRDI QIDQ5475030
Publication date: 16 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00383
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