Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
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Publication:2013344
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.04.003zbMATH Open1393.91122OpenAlexW2606966434MaRDI QIDQ2013344FDOQ2013344
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.003
Recommendations
- Nash equilibrium in stable matching problems
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
- Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
- Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences
- Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Efficient assignment respecting priorities
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Constrained school choice
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
Cited In (9)
- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
- Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
- Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
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