Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
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Publication:4006254
DOI10.2307/2951675zbMath0761.90004MaRDI QIDQ4006254
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Publication date: 26 September 1992
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951675
91B14: Social choice
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