Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium (Q694739)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6115531
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| English | Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6115531 |
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Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium (English)
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13 December 2012
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This paper works on a concept derived from Maskin's definition of implementation. The new approach is developed by allowing for mixed equilibria as outcomes. A necessary condition for social choice correspondences implementation in the new sense, named set-monotonicity, is established. Set-monotonicity and no veto-power are, on the other way, sufficient to guarantee implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium, in environments with at least three players.
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implementation
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Maskin monotonicity
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set-monotonicity
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social choice correspondence
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pure and mixed Nash equilibrium
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0.8475137948989868
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0.8378337025642395
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0.8347917795181274
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0.8212913274765015
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0.819398045539856
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