Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
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This paper works on a concept derived from Maskin's definition of implementation. The new approach is developed by allowing for mixed equilibria as outcomes. A necessary condition for social choice correspondences implementation in the new sense, named set-monotonicity, is established. Set-monotonicity and no veto-power are, on the other way, sufficient to guarantee implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium, in environments with at least three players.
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Cites work
- A crash course in implementation theory
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- Bayesian Implementation
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
- On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Rationalizable implementation
- Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
- Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
Cited in
(26)- Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
- Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
- Nash implementation of the majority rule
- On implementation via demand commitment games
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
- Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
- Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
- Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
- Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
- Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Safe implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in majority voting
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Complexity and repeated implementation
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