Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
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Publication:622574
DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0470-9zbMath1232.91190OpenAlexW2055414514MaRDI QIDQ622574
Matteo Triossi, Luis C. Corchon
Publication date: 3 February 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/13427
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Cites Work
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