Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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Publication:4262861
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00076zbMATH Open0956.91034OpenAlexW2136096971MaRDI QIDQ4262861FDOQ4262861
Authors: Eric Maskin 
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00076
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- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems
- New axioms for deferred acceptance
- On the alternating use of ``unanimity and ``surjectivity in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
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- On the constrained Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
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- Complexity and repeated implementation
- Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism
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- Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
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