Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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Publication:4262861
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00076zbMath0956.91034OpenAlexW2136096971MaRDI QIDQ4262861
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00076
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