Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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Publication:4262861
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00076zbMATH Open0956.91034OpenAlexW2136096971MaRDI QIDQ4262861FDOQ4262861
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00076
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Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory
- Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule
- Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences
- Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences
- Top-pair and top-triple monotonicity
- Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
- Nash implementation of the majority rule
- Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
- Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations
- Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
- Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- On avoiding vote swapping
- Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
- Let them cheat!
- Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment
- Implementation without rationality assumptions
- Implementation with evidence
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Ex post implementation
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Implementability via protective equilibria
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- Mechanism design with model specification
- The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
- A note on the individualistic foundations of the core in economies with asymmetric information
- Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
- Quantum Bayesian implementation
- Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
- Design of price mechanisms for network resource allocation via price of anarchy
- Quantum extensive-form games
- The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
- Aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality
- Rationalizable implementation
- Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
- Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Bargaining and bargaining sets.
- House allocation with transfers
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- Picking the winners
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
- Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining
- Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations
- Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models
- Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
- An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
- Implementation via backward induction
- Fair social orderings
- A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
- The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
- Maskin monotonic aggregation rules and partial anonymity
- Monotonicity and robustness of majority rule
- Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
- A dictatorial domain for monotone social choice functions
- On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
- Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
- Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
- Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
- Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
- Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
- Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness
- Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
- Symmetric mechanism design
- Peter J. Hammond
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
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