Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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Publication:4262861
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00076zbMATH Open0956.91034OpenAlexW2136096971MaRDI QIDQ4262861FDOQ4262861
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00076
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Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Credible implementation
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
- Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
- On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
- Implementation by mediated equilibrium
- Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations
- Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
- A game-theoretical analysis of poliomyelitis vaccination
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
- On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results
- Structural instability of the core
- Introduction to computer science and economic theory
- A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
- Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Walrasian social choice in a large economy
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
- An equal right solution to the compensation-reponsibility dilemma
- Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills
- Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
- Share equilibrium in local public good economies
- Verifiability and group formation in markets
- Divide-and-permute
- Nash equilibrium and the law of large numbers
- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Pareto improving taxes
- Implementation with partial provability
- Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- On the implementation of the median
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
- Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals
- Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
- Secure implementation in allotment economies
- Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation
- Voluntary implementation
- Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
- Private information in large economies
- Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
- Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Robust dynamic implementation
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
- Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
- Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces
- Epsilon-Nash implementation
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Full implementation in backward induction
- Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
- Preference domains and the monotonicity of Condorcet extensions
- Nash implementation in production economies
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process
- Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The no envy approach to compensation
- Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design
- Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
- Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
- Symmetric mechanism design
- Peter J. Hammond
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
- Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers
- Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
- Nash implementation and the bargaining problem
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems
- New axioms for deferred acceptance
- On the alternating use of ``unanimity and ``surjectivity in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Bargaining through approval
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