Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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Publication:4262861
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00076zbMATH Open0956.91034OpenAlexW2136096971MaRDI QIDQ4262861FDOQ4262861
Authors: Eric Maskin 
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00076
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- Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
- Symmetric mechanism design
- Peter J. Hammond
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
- Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers
- Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
- Nash implementation and the bargaining problem
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems
- New axioms for deferred acceptance
- On the alternating use of ``unanimity and ``surjectivity in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Bargaining through approval
- The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
- A characterization of egalitarian equivalence
- On the constrained Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
- The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
- Spatial implementation
- Complexity and repeated implementation
- Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism
- Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
- Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
- Jacobian discrepancies and rational singularities
- A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
- Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable
- On combining implementable social choice rules
- A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods
- Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory
- Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule
- Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences
- Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences
- Top-pair and top-triple monotonicity
- Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
- Nash implementation of the majority rule
- Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
- Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations
- Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
- Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- On avoiding vote swapping
- Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
- Let them cheat!
- Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment
- Implementation without rationality assumptions
- Implementation with evidence
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Ex post implementation
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Implementability via protective equilibria
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- Mechanism design with model specification
- The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
- A note on the individualistic foundations of the core in economies with asymmetric information
- Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
- Quantum Bayesian implementation
- Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
- Design of price mechanisms for network resource allocation via price of anarchy
- Quantum extensive-form games
- The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
- Aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality
- Rationalizable implementation
- Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
- Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
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