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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
- Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
- Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness
- Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
- Credible implementation
- A ``super folk theorem for dynastic repeated games
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
- Game-theoretical model of retroactive hepatitis B vaccination in China
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
- Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule
- Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
- Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage
- On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
- Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory
- Meta level equilibrium selection for two illustrative noncooperative games
- Walrasian and constrained Walrasian correspondences and Nash implementation
- Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences
- Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
- Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
- Replicator-mutator dynamics with evolutionary public goods game-environmental feedbacks
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
- Symmetric mechanism design
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Implementation by mediated equilibrium
- Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Metrizable preferences over preferences
- Constrained implementation
- Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization
- Pareto efficiency and approximate Pareto efficiency in routing and load balancing games
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Implementation in partial equilibrium
- The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
- Games without rules
- Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences
- Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
- Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
- Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- Two-player rationalizable implementation
- Peter J. Hammond
- Targeting in social networks with anonymized information
- A game-theoretical analysis of poliomyelitis vaccination
- Direct implementation with evidence
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- One-step-ahead implementation
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
- Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
- Top-pair and top-triple monotonicity
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- Implementation theory
- Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
- Process manipulation in unique implementation
- Nash implementation of the majority rule
- Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- On the structure of informationally robust optimal mechanisms
- Intrinsic impediments to category captainship collaboration
- No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
- Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
- Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
- Privacy in implementation
- Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations
- Individual preferences, government policy, and COVID-19: a game-theoretic epidemiological analysis
- Structural instability of the core
- Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets
- On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results
- A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
- Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
- On avoiding vote swapping
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism
- Introduction to computer science and economic theory
- Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Walrasian social choice in a large economy
- Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
- An equal right solution to the compensation-reponsibility dilemma
- A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment
- Let them cheat!
- Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment
- Implementation without rationality assumptions
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
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