Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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Publication:4262861
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00076zbMATH Open0956.91034OpenAlexW2136096971MaRDI QIDQ4262861FDOQ4262861
Authors: Eric Maskin 
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00076
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- Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
- Symmetric mechanism design
- Peter J. Hammond
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
- Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers
- Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
- Nash implementation and the bargaining problem
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems
- New axioms for deferred acceptance
- On the alternating use of ``unanimity and ``surjectivity in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Bargaining through approval
- The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
- A characterization of egalitarian equivalence
- On the constrained Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
- The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
- Spatial implementation
- Complexity and repeated implementation
- Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism
- Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
- Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
- Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
- A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
- Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable
- On combining implementable social choice rules
- A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods
- Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
- Game-theoretical model of retroactive hepatitis B vaccination in China
- Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
- Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
- Metrizable preferences over preferences
- Constrained implementation
- Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization
- Implementation in partial equilibrium
- Targeting in social networks with anonymized information
- Games without rules
- Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- One-step-ahead implementation
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- Individual preferences, government policy, and COVID-19: a game-theoretic epidemiological analysis
- Process manipulation in unique implementation
- A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment
- Condorcet completion methods that inhibit manipulation through exploiting knowledge of electorate preferences
- Implementing Lindahl allocations in a warm-glow economy
- Switching from complete to incomplete information
- An efficient dynamic allocation mechanism for security in networks of interdependent strategic agents
- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
- Imperfect vaccine can yield multiple Nash equilibria in vaccination games
- The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union
- Two-agent interactive implementation
- Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
- Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
- Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium
- Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
- Dividing bads under additive utilities
- Motives and implementation with rights structures
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- Cost and complexity of harnessing games with payments
- High endemic levels of typhoid fever in rural areas of Ghana may stem from optimal voluntary vaccination behaviour
- Primary versus secondary infrastructure capacity allocation mechanisms
- A spatial analogue of May's theorem
- Second thoughts of social dilemma in mechanism design
- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
- Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
- A spatial analogue of May's theorem
- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
- Should straw polls be banned?
- The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production
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