Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(91)90040-XzbMath0732.90020MaRDI QIDQ809860

Guoqiang Tian, Q. Li

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designLindahl allocationspublic goods economiescompletely feasible and continuous implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
• On the constrained Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences
• On differentiability of cost functions
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Feasible and Continuous Implementation
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash-Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies