Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(91)90040-XMaRDI QIDQ809860zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Guoqiang Tian, Qi Li

Publication date 1991

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(91)90040-X

zbMATH Keywords

completely feasible and continuous implementationLindahl allocationsmechanism designpublic goods economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites work

• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• Feasible and Continuous Implementation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3974667 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3307201 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3083088 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash-Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies
• On differentiability of cost functions
• On the constrained Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points

Cited in

(11)

• Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
• Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches
• A solution to the problem of consumption externalities.
• Efficient provision of public goods with endogenous redistribution
• On Nash-implementation in the presence of withholding
• Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism
• Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results
• Continuous and feasible implementation of rational-expectations Lindahl allocations
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4209885 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension

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