Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
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Publication:4138424
DOI10.2307/1912672zbMATH Open0363.90015OpenAlexW3126081580MaRDI QIDQ4138424FDOQ4138424
Authors: Theodore Groves, John O. Ledyard
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/144.pdf
Cited In (91)
- On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
- Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing
- Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
- Pricing and equity in cross-regional green supply chains
- A voluntary participation game through a unit-by-unit cost share mechanism of a non-excludable public good
- On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
- Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence
- A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
- Arbitration of two-party disputes under ignorance
- The price of `one person, one vote'
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations
- Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
- Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer
- Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
- Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax
- Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
- Economic juries and public project provision
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Efficient allocation with continuous quantities
- A characterization of equilibria in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism
- Competitive equilibrium with local public goods
- Counting Groves-Ledyard equilibria via degree theory
- How well do people play a quantum prisoner's dilemma?
- Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
- Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
- Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
- A note on the relationship of interdependent action to the optimality of certain voting decisions
- Participation and demand levels for a joint project
- Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
- Evolutionary implementation in a public goods game
- Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
- One person/one vote is not efficient given information on factions
- A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
- Markets for public decision-making
- Optimal nonlinear income taxation with a finite population
- A difficulty with the command allocation mechanism
- A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
- Scheduling under dynamic speed-scaling for minimizing weighted completion time and energy consumption
- Non-excludable public good experiments
- A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good
- Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism
- Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- Repeated implementation
- Class shares and economies of scope
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods
- Huge progeny production during the transient of a quasi-species model of viral infection, reproduction and mutation
- A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
- A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods
- Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
- Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses
- Does team competition increase pro-social lending? Evidence from online microfinance
- Introduction to the special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of John O. Ledyard
- Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms
- Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability
- One man, one bid
- Discrete implementation of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism
- Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
- Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good.
- A simple(r) Lindahl solution to the provision of public goods with warm-glow: efficiency and implementation
- Implementing Lindahl allocations in a warm-glow economy
- The core of the participatory budgeting problem
- Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
- Incentives, iterative communication, and organizational control
- Optimal provision of public goods through Nash equilibria
- Coevolution of nonlinear group interactions and strategies in well-mixed and structured populations
- The roles of heterogeneous investment mechanism in the public goods game on scale-free networks
- The public goods game with shared punishment cost in well-mixed and structured populations
- The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods -- the general case
- Evolution of global contribution in multi-level threshold public goods games with insurance compensation
- The joker effect: cooperation driven by destructive agents
- Revelation of preferences for public goods: Aggregation by abelian operations
- Voting and paying for public goods: An application of the theory of the core
- Risk externalities: when financial imperfections are not the problem, but part of the solution
- Evolutionary dynamics in the spatial public goods game with tolerance-based expulsion and cooperation
- Mechanism design for demand management in energy communities
- Give and let give: alternative mechanisms based on voluntary contributions
- Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations
- Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation
- Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- The emergence and implementation of pool exclusion in spatial public goods game with heterogeneous ability-to-pay
- Experimental gaming comparison of resource allocation rules in case of transferable utilities
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