Non-excludable public good experiments

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.11.002zbMath1151.91433MaRDI QIDQ1886746

Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Timothy N. Cason, Takehiko Yamato, Konomu Yokotani

Publication date: 19 November 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-170555282

zbMATH Keywords

Fairness; Hawk--Dove game; Laboratory; Social preferences; Spite; Voluntary contribution mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A18: Games in extensive form

91B18: Public goods

91A90: Experimental studies

Related Items

Non-excludable public good experiments, Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods

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