A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2476zbMATH Open0919.90037OpenAlexW2048584336MaRDI QIDQ1289261FDOQ1289261

Authors: Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Takehiko Yamato 

Publication date: 27 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2476

Recommendations

• Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
• Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
• A voluntary participation game through a unit-by-unit cost share mechanism of a non-excludable public good
• Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation
• The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designpublic goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (20)

• Invitation games: an experimental approach to coalition formation
• A voluntary participation game through a unit-by-unit cost share mechanism of a non-excludable public good
• Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game
• The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games
• Moral hazard and free riding in collective action
• Coalition-proofness and dominance relations
• The coevolution of partner switching and strategy updating in non-excludable public goods game
• Providing public goods in two steps
• On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
• Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
• Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
• Participation and demand levels for a joint project
• Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation
• Group rewarding can promote cooperation and save costs in public goods games
• Non-excludable public good experiments
• A private contributions game for joint replenishment
• Steady-state stock and group size: an approach of dynamic voluntary provisions of public goods
• The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency
• The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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