The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
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Publication:2482637
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2007.05.009zbMATH Open1133.91396OpenAlexW2090326430MaRDI QIDQ2482637FDOQ2482637
Authors: Kiho Yoon 
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.009
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Cites Work
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- The modified Vickrey double auction
Cited In (18)
- VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities
- The core of the participatory budgeting problem
- Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
- Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability
- Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
- The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism
- Undominated Groves mechanisms
- On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism
- Knightian analysis of the Vickrey mechanism
- A new characterization of the Groves-Clarke mechanism
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence
- The modified Vickrey double auction
- Inefficiency of equilibria in digital mechanisms with continuous valuations
- Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
- On the fastest Vickrey algorithm
- Strategy-proof budgeting via a VCG-like mechanism
- Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
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