The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2007.05.009MaRDI QIDQ2482637zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kiho Yoon

Publication date 23 April 2008

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.009

zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic efficiencydouble auctionparticipation feesVickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• A dominant strategy double auction
• An Efficient Auction
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• Cores of convex games
• Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
• Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3881695 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1351867 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
• Incentives in Teams
• Microeconomic theory
• Robust trading mechanisms
• The modified Vickrey double auction
• The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism
• The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms

Cited in

(19)

• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence
• A new characterization of the Groves-Clarke mechanism
• The modified Vickrey double auction
• Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
• VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities
• On the fastest Vickrey algorithm
• Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
• Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
• Electronic service matching: failure of incentive compatibility in vickrey auctions
• Inefficiency of equilibria in digital mechanisms with continuous valuations
• Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
• The core of the participatory budgeting problem
• Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
• Knightian analysis of the Vickrey mechanism
• Undominated Groves mechanisms
• Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability
• The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism
• Strategy-proof budgeting via a VCG-like mechanism
• On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism

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