Undominated Groves Mechanisms

DOI10.1613/jair.3810zbMath1259.68191arXiv1203.1809OpenAlexW2147222221MaRDI QIDQ4907834

Krzysztof R. Apt, Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer, Evangelos Markakis

Publication date: 25 February 2013

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1203.1809

zbMATH Keywords

VCGGroves mechanismClarke mechanismindividually dominatedindividually undominated

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

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Groves mechanisms and communication externalities ⋮ Competitive VCG Redistribution Mechanism for Public Project Problem ⋮ Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting ⋮ Greater flexibility in mechanism design through altruism ⋮ Expressive markets for donating to charities ⋮ Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms ⋮ Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets ⋮ Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms ⋮ Binary public decisions and undominated mechanisms ⋮ Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies

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