Undominated Groves Mechanisms
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Publication:4907834
DOI10.1613/jair.3810zbMath1259.68191arXiv1203.1809OpenAlexW2147222221MaRDI QIDQ4907834
Krzysztof R. Apt, Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer, Evangelos Markakis
Publication date: 25 February 2013
Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1203.1809
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)
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