Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies

DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01336-9zbMath1481.91080OpenAlexW3161306797MaRDI QIDQ2068880

Efthymios Athanasiou, Giacomo Valletta

Publication date: 20 January 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01336-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

Binary public decisions and undominated mechanisms

Cites Work

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• Incentives in Teams
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Undominated Groves Mechanisms

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