scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343724
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3524718
Recommendations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5309433
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- Algorithmic mechanism design
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
- The complexity of optimal mechanism design
Cited in
(55)- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions
- Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs
- Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain
- Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
- Algorithms for strategyproof classification
- On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections
- Incentive compatible regression learning
- Binary public decisions and undominated mechanisms
- Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies
- Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
- Aided design of market mechanisms for electricity clusters
- Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets
- Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
- Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies
- An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism
- Efficiency and complexity of price competition among single-product vendors
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
- Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
- On influence, stable behavior, and the most influential individuals in networks: a game-theoretic approach
- Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
- Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
- Social choice theory in HOL. Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite
- SBBA: a strongly-budget-balanced double-auction mechanism
- Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
- Characterization of truthful mechanisms for one-dimensional single facility location game with payments
- Optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem with two-dimensional types
- Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
- Efficient money burning in general domains
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5309433 (Why is no real title available?)
- Nonpreemptive coordination mechanisms for identical machines
- Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks
- Arrow Gibbard Satterthwaite
- Optimal contract design for effort-averse sensors
- Efficient money burning in general domains
- Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization
- Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7053320 (Why is no real title available?)
- Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
- A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling
- Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets
- Combinatorial reallocation mechanisms
- Strategy-proof rules in object allocation problems with hard budget constraints and income effects
- Characterizing group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money
- Formal verification and synthesis of mechanisms for social choice
- An improved bound for the price of anarchy for related machine scheduling
- Binary public decisions with a status quo: undominated mechanisms without harm
- Decentralized subcontractor scheduling with divisible jobs
- Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
- Balanced allocation mechanism: an optimal mechanism for multiple keywords sponsored search auctions
- Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning
This page was built for publication:
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3524718)
