An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism

DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2015.04.013MaRDI QIDQ2346377zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors I. Caragiannis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Ariel D. Procaccia

Publication date 1 June 2015

Published in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2015.04.013

zbMATH Keywords

matchingmechanism designpairwise kidney exchange

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• A Bounded-Risk Mechanism for the Kidney Exchange Game
• Mix and match: a strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
• A bounded-risk mechanism for the kidney exchange game
• Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs
• Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343724 (Why is no real title available?)
• Kidney Exchange
• Maximum weight cycle packing in directed graphs, with application to kidney exchange programs
• Pairwise kidney exchange

Cited in

(14)

• A bounded-risk mechanism for the kidney exchange game
• A theoretical and computational equilibria analysis of a multi-player kidney exchange program
• Mix and match: a strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
• Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs
• Opting into optimal matchings
• Strategyproof mechanism design for facility location games with weighted agents on a line
• Nash equilibria in the two-player kidney exchange game
• Truthful generalized assignments via stable matching
• Efficient stabilization of cooperative matching games
• Identifying optimal strategies in kidney exchange games is \(\varSigma_2^p\)-complete
• Rejection-proof mechanisms for multi-agent kidney exchange
• Operational research approaches and mathematical models for kidney exchange: a literature survey and empirical evaluation
• On the strategyproof allocation of items under a budget constraint
• Pairwise kidney exchange

This page was built for publication: An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2346377)