Strategyproof mechanism design for facility location games with weighted agents on a line
DOI10.1007/S10878-013-9598-8zbMATH Open1312.91056OpenAlexW2060390705MaRDI QIDQ489723FDOQ489723
Authors: Minming Li, Qiang Zhang 
Publication date: 21 January 2015
Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-013-9598-8
Recommendations
- Approximation strategy-proof mechanisms for obnoxious facility location on a line
- A survey on approximation mechanism design without money for facility games
- Strategy-proof mechanisms for facility location games with many facilities
- Two-facility location games with minimum distance requirement
- Approximation randomized strategy-proof mechanisms in obnoxious facility game with weighted agents
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)
Cites Work
- Incentives in Teams
- Winner-imposing strategyproof mechanisms for multiple facility location games
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- Strategy-proof mechanisms for facility location games with many facilities
- Truth, justice, and cake cutting
- Mix and match: a strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism
- Mechanisms for obnoxious facility game on a path
Cited In (17)
- Multiple facility location games with envy ratio
- Constrained heterogeneous two-facility location games with sum-variant
- Approximately Optimal Mechanisms for Strategyproof Facility Location: Minimizing Lp Norm of Costs
- Multiple facility location games with envy ratio
- Minmax for facility location game with optional preference under minimum distance requirement
- Two-facility location games with distance requirement
- The obnoxious facility location game with dichotomous preferences
- Approximation randomized strategy-proof mechanisms in obnoxious facility game with weighted agents
- Strategyproof mechanisms for \(2\)-facility location games with minimax envy
- Mechanism design for one-facility location game with obnoxious effects on a line
- Nearly complete characterization of 2-agent deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for single facility location in \(L_p\) space
- Constrained heterogeneous facility location games with max-variant cost
- Constrained heterogeneous two-facility location games with max-variant cost
- Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources
- Mechanism Design for One-Facility Location Game with Obnoxious Effects
- Two-facility location games with minimum distance requirement
- Facility location games with optional preference
This page was built for publication: Strategyproof mechanism design for facility location games with weighted agents on a line
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q489723)
