Strategyproof mechanisms for \(2\)-facility location games with minimax envy

DOI10.1007/s10878-021-00711-7zbMath1497.91073OpenAlexW3131219384MaRDI QIDQ2156318

Qingqin Nong, Yuan Ding, Qizhi Fang, Wenjing Liu, Xin Chen

Publication date: 18 July 2022

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-021-00711-7

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessmechanism designfacility location gamemaximum envy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

Constrained heterogeneous facility location games with max-variant cost

Cites Work

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• Algorithmic mechanism design

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