Strategyproof mechanisms for \(2\)-facility location games with minimax envy
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Publication:2156318
DOI10.1007/s10878-021-00711-7zbMath1497.91073OpenAlexW3131219384MaRDI QIDQ2156318
Qingqin Nong, Yuan Ding, Qizhi Fang, Wenjing Liu, Xin Chen
Publication date: 18 July 2022
Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-021-00711-7
Applications of game theory (91A80) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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Cites Work
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