On the Power of Deterministic Mechanisms for Facility Location Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-39206-1_38zbMath1336.91028arXiv1207.0935OpenAlexW2568674247WikidataQ59818387 ScholiaQ59818387MaRDI QIDQ5326582

Christos Tzamos, Dimitris Fotakis

Publication date: 6 August 2013

Published in: Automata, Languages, and Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1207.0935

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

A cost-sharing scheme for the \(k\)-level facility location game with penalties, Strategyproof facility location in perturbation stable instances, Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions, Strategyproof mechanisms for \(2\)-facility location games with minimax envy, Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Obnoxious Facility Location on a Line, Mechanisms for dual-role-facility location games: truthfulness and approximability, Strategyproof facility location with limited locations, Facility location games with distinct desires, Strategic Online Facility Location, Conference Program Design with Single-Peaked and Single-Crossing Preferences, Two-facility location games with distance requirement, Constrained heterogeneous two-facility location games with max-variant cost, The capacity constrained facility location problem, Approximation strategy-proof mechanisms for obnoxious facility location on a line, Multiple facility location games with envy ratio, Two-facility Location Games with Minimum Distance Requirement